{"id":11237,"date":"2025-11-21T16:27:05","date_gmt":"2025-11-21T15:27:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carteldamageclaims.com\/?p=11237"},"modified":"2025-11-21T16:34:51","modified_gmt":"2025-11-21T15:34:51","slug":"dairy-cartel-the-next-level-of-private-antitrust-enforcement-commercial-court-no-14-of-madrid-finds-a-9-4-undercharge","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carteldamageclaims.com\/de\/2025\/11\/21\/dairy-cartel-the-next-level-of-private-antitrust-enforcement-commercial-court-no-14-of-madrid-finds-a-9-4-undercharge\/","title":{"rendered":"Dairy Cartel \u2013 the next level of private antitrust enforcement: Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid finds a 9.4% undercharge"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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On 16 October 2025, Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid delivered a judgment<\/a>[1]<\/a> of notable relevance in the well-known Spanish Dairy Cartel case<\/em><\/a>. The decision, issued by Judge Ms Carmen Gonz\u00e1lez Su\u00e1rez in Ordinary Proceedings No. 588\/2022, partially upheld a private damage claim brought against Grupo Lactalis Iberia, S.A. <\/em>(Lactalis) and Industrias L\u00e1cteas de Granada, S.L.U. <\/em>(Puleva), recognising their participation in a collusive agreement that affected the Spanish national market for the supply of raw milk between 2000 and 2013.<\/p>\n\n

The Court found that the defendants engaged in a systematic exchange of commercially sensitive information leading to price-fixing, allocation of farmers (suppliers), and control of surpluses, thereby infringing Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Act (Ley de Defensa de la Competencia<\/em>, LDC). Unlike most cartel cases, where producers or suppliers of a certain product are engaged in anti-competitive agreements, the Dairy Cartel<\/em> concerns antitrust practices conducted by the buyers, namely the companies buying raw milk, who aimed at achieving a cheaper supply by preventing farmers from negotiating prices on fair terms.<\/p>\n\n

This judgment represents a significant step forward in consolidating civil actions arising from such kind of anti-competitive practices. It also establishes important criteria regarding the statute of limitations, the quantification of damages, and the application of compensatory and default interest.<\/p>\n\n

The Court<\/strong> accepted the methodology of the claimant\u2019s experts<\/strong> and<\/strong> found a 9.4% undercharge in the raw milk market<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

At the heart of this case lies the assessment and quantification of harm caused by the buyers\u2019 cartel, which is an exceptional scenario in competition law. Unlike a traditional sellers\u2019 cartel, where undertakings collude to raise prices or restrict output, a buyers\u2019 cartel involves coordination among purchasers to depress input prices. In this instance, major dairy processors exchanged sensitive commercial information and agreed on purchasing strategies to keep the prices paid to farmers artificially low.<\/p>\n\n

On the quantification of harm, the Court rejected a mere judicial estimation[2]<\/a>, and instead, conducted a detailed technical assessment of the economic expert evidence submitted. The judgment, with certain qualifications, accepted the methodology of the claimant\u2019s experts, considering it the most robust and coherent from an econometric perspective.<\/p>\n\n

The Court\u2019s analysis focused on the price undercharge, that is, the mirror image of the classic \u201covercharge<\/em>\u201d observed in sellers\u2019 cartels. A buyers\u2019 cartel pushes prices downward below what would have prevailed in a properly functioning market with a fairer balance of bargaining power between suppliers and buyers. This leads to a distorted distribution of resources and profits between the suppliers and the purchasers undermining the competitive process. In this case, the farmers suppling raw milk could have obtained a higher price absent the cartel, which would have supported more efficient competitive dynamics in Spain\u2019s raw-milk market enhancing the viability of the farmers\u2019 operations. However, the coordinated purchasing behaviour of the cartelists prevented that outcome. Accordingly, the undercharge represents the difference between the prices actually received by the farmers and those that would have prevailed under competitive conditions. Two complementary methods were employed: oligopolistic simulations and Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis.<\/p>\n\n

The simulations assessed competition in prices and quantities (Bertrand and Cournot models), considering the market shares of the participants according to CNMC data. The results indicated prices between 8.6% and 13.9% lower for transactions involving cartel members, and between 7.3% and 9.6% lower for non-members as a consequence of the umbrella effect. The DiD analysis, comparing price trends in Spain with unaffected markets (Portugal and Italy) during and after the infringement period, revealed prices between 9.4% and 11% lower. The consistency between both methods reinforced the robustness of the conclusions. Both approaches incorporated controls relating to the Consumer Price Index, import levels, and milk quality, as well as sensitivity analyses to test the reliability of results.<\/p>\n\n

However, because the claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence, the Court limited the affected volume of commerce to sales made directly to the cartel participants, excluding potential umbrella effects. As noted, this limitation was due to the lack of adequate evidence, not to a finding that such effects did not occur. In other words, the Judge did not question the general validity of the umbrella effect but concluded that the evidence presented in this case was insufficient to substantiate their occurrence.<\/p>\n\n

Exercising discretion, the Judge ultimately fixed the level of undercharge at 9.4%, adopting the lower bound of the range estimated by the claimant, as the mid-point proposed by the experts was deemed insufficiently justified.<\/p>\n\n

This finding is particularly noteworthy as it provides a judicially endorsed quantification of harm in a buyers\u2019 cartel context, an area where economic methodologies and legal reasoning have historically been underdeveloped. By validating the use of advanced econometric tools such as simulation models and DiD analysis, the judgment sets an important precedent for future private enforcement actions in Spain.<\/p>\n\n

The <\/strong>l<\/strong>imitation <\/strong>p<\/strong>eriod <\/strong>h<\/strong>ad <\/strong>n<\/strong>ot <\/strong>y<\/strong>et <\/strong>b<\/strong>egun to <\/strong>r<\/strong>un <\/strong>w<\/strong>hile <\/strong>j<\/strong>udicial <\/strong>r<\/strong>eview <\/strong>p<\/strong>roceedings <\/strong>r<\/strong>emain <\/strong>p<\/strong>ending<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Regarding the statute of limitations, the Madrid Court applies the recent Supreme Court doctrine on the computation of limitation periods in antitrust damages cases. Referring to the Supreme Court judgments 889\/2025<\/em><\/a> of 5 June 2025<\/em> and 2857\/2025<\/em><\/a> of 17 June 2025<\/em>, issued concerning the Envelopes Cartel<\/em><\/a>, the Madrid Court rejected the argument that the limitation period began to run upon the mere publication of the administrative infringement decision.<\/p>\n\n

Rather, in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, judgment of 22 June 2022, Case C-267\/20, AB Volvo and DAF Trucks NV v RM<\/em><\/a>) and the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in the Sugar Cartel case (STS 408\/2012)<\/em>, the initial point for the running of time must be the date on which the administrative decision becomes final.<\/p>\n\n

In the present case, the CNMC (Spanish National Competition Authority) Decision has been appealed by its addressees, and some appeals are still pending, including those filed by Lactalis and Puleva, who were the defendants in the case at hand. The Court held that the limitation period for private damage claims had not yet begun to run. However, even if reference were made to the CNMC\u2019s 2019 Decision and limitation had not been interrupted, the five-year period provided for in Article 10 of <\/em>Directive 2014\/104\/EU<\/em><\/a> and Article 74.1 of the <\/em>LDC<\/em><\/a> would still render the action brought in November 2022 within the statutory term.<\/p>\n\n

The <\/strong>C<\/strong>ourt <\/strong>t<\/strong>reats the <\/strong>c<\/strong>laim as a <\/strong>s<\/em><\/strong>tand-<\/em><\/strong>a<\/em><\/strong>lone<\/em><\/strong> a<\/strong>ction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Another relevant aspect of the judgment is the characterisation of the relevant claim as a stand-alone<\/em> action. The Court carried out an autonomous and comprehensive assessment of the existence of collusive conduct, based on the evidentiary material produced in the civil proceedings, given that the CNMC Decision is not yet final. However, the Decision already holds significant evidential value and persuasive weight under the national rules of evidence.<\/p>\n\n

This interpretation aligns with the recent CJEU case-law (Case C-21\/24, CP v Nissan Iberia<\/em><\/a>), which establishes that the limitation period for damages actions arising from infringements of competition law cannot begin while the Decision of the competition authority remains under judicial review. In doing so, the Madrid Court takes the view that, where appeals are still pending, the action must be considered independent, without prejudice to the fact that the appealed administrative decision retains qualified evidential value. This approach has considerable practical significance, as it provides legal certainty in numerous disputes arising from non-final decisions of the national competition authority.<\/p>\n\n

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of certain defendants, making the Decision final for them<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Three appeals against the CNMC Decision lodged with the Supreme Court by parties other than the defendants in Madrid have been dismissed. The CNMC Decision has thus become final with respect to Central Lechera de Galicia, S.L. (Celega), Corporaci\u00f3n Alimentaria Pe\u00f1asanta, S.A. (CAPSA), and Nestl\u00e9 Espa\u00f1a, S.A. (Nestl\u00e9).<\/p>\n\n

Other appeals are still pending. This includes the following addresses of the CNMC Decision: Puleva, Lactalis, Danone, S.A. (Danone), and Calidad Pascual, S.A. (Pascual). Consequently, for these undertakings, the CNMC Decision cannot yet be regarded as final.<\/p>\n\n

In proceedings for damages, this distinction entails that, for Celega, CAPSA and Nestl\u00e9, the findings and conclusions of the CNMC Decision have a fully binding effect and may be relied upon as final determinations of fact and law in subsequent civil or administrative proceedings. By contrast, in the case of Puleva, Lactalis, Danone and Pascual, where there is not yet finality, the sanctioning decision still serves as a \u201chighly authoritative instrument of conviction<\/em>\u201d, considering its technical rigour and the extensive evidentiary material on which it is based.<\/p>\n\n

The judgment distinguishes between compensatory, default, and procedural interest, applying compound interest throughout in line with Supreme Court doctrine<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

The judgment further provides a detailed distinction between the various types of interest applicable to compensation.<\/p>\n\n