{"id":11287,"date":"2026-01-21T16:48:25","date_gmt":"2026-01-21T15:48:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carteldamageclaims.com\/?p=11287"},"modified":"2026-01-21T17:09:31","modified_gmt":"2026-01-21T16:09:31","slug":"a-5-overcharge-as-minimum-damages-for-antitrust-violations-recent-developments-in-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carteldamageclaims.com\/de\/2026\/01\/21\/a-5-overcharge-as-minimum-damages-for-antitrust-violations-recent-developments-in-europe\/","title":{"rendered":"A 5% Overcharge as Minimum Damages for Antitrust Violations?! Recent Developments in Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Courts throughout Europe increasingly adopt a minimum damages approach in antitrust cases, unanimously presuming at least a 5% overcharge, driven by grounds of compensation, effectiveness and deterrence. Recent judgments \u2013 from the CAT (UK) to the Spanish Supreme Court, Norway\u2019s courts, the Court of Appeal in Stuttgart, the Dieselgate rulings of the German and Austrian Supreme Courts, and finally the European Court of Justice \u2013 point to a converging practice and a structured approach to quantifying damages across the EU.<\/em><\/p>\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

The full effectiveness of the competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires that anyone can seek compensation before national courts for harm resulting from violations of those provisions. This is well established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The EU Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014\/104) further stipulates a legal presumption \u2013 already recognised by many national courts \u2013 that infringements in the form of cartels (e.g., price fixing, market sharing or customer allocation) cause harm.<\/p>\n\n

The quantification<\/strong> of that harm, however, remains highly contentious in all cartel damages proceedings. Only a few Member States provide for a statutory presumption regarding the amount (see Romania: 20% overcharge, Hungary and Latvia: 10%), and these presumptions are rebuttable. Defendants regularly argue that they fall within the (empirically rare) exceptional category of cases in which a cartel had no, or only marginal, market effects \u2013 even where long\u2011running collusion has been proven despite the constant risk of antitrust penalties.<\/p>\n\n

By contrast, claimants must quantify the harm suffered to substantiate their damages claims, or at least provide sufficient evidence to enable a judicial estimation. This is often costly, and claimants frequently lack access to the necessary data and evidence. Sometimes, economic expert opinions are required, the cost of which may even exceed the expected compensation (notwithstanding other litigation risks). This often deters claimants from pursuing legitimate claims for damages at all, thereby undermining in practice the effective enforcement of EU competition law.<\/p>\n\n

A new development, however, may shift this dynamic. Where it is sufficiently likely, based on the facts of the infringement and the market conditions, that a claimant has suffered harm, courts across Europe increasingly accept the notion of a \u201cminimum amount<\/strong>\u201d. To address the shortcomings of economic damage analyses and ensure the effectiveness of EU competition law, those courts unanimously assume at least a \u201c5% overcharge<\/strong>\u201d on cartelised goods or services. Recent CJEU case law<\/strong> appears to support this approach.<\/p>\n\n

Starting point: truck cartel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

The emergence of the 5% benchmark can be traced primarily to the well\u2011known truck cartel, which has significantly shaped the development of private antitrust enforcement throughout Europe.<\/p>\n\n

United Kingdom<\/em><\/p>\n\n

Following the European Commission\u2019s 2016 infringement decision finding that several truck manufacturers had colluded for 14 years in setting gross list prices, the London Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) delivered its judgment on 7 February 2023 (Royal Mail & BT v DAF <\/em>[2023] CAT 6<\/a>). It awarded \u00a338.5 million in damages and interest to Royal Mail and BT against DAF. Convinced that an overcharge existed, the CAT ultimately wielded the \u201cbroad axe<\/strong>\u201d to place a value on it. After extensive hearings, neither party\u2019s experts nor their regression models persuaded the tribunal. According to the CAT, \u201cno regression model\u201d would yield a definitive solution due to data imperfections and the complexity of the task.<\/p>\n\n

In the end, the CAT\u2019s \u201cfair and reasonable<\/strong>\u201d solution was Solomonic: it assumed a 5% overcharge<\/strong> on the value of commerce (VoC) for both Royal Mail and BT for the entire relevant period \u2013 roughly half of what the claimants had argued, while DAF denied any damage whatsoever.<\/p>\n\n

DAF\u2019s appeals were subsequently dismissed ([2024] EWCA Civ 181<\/a> and UKSC 2024\/0052<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

Spain<\/em><\/p>\n\n

The approach taken by the CAT reflects an emerging European convergence toward judicial estimation of cartel harm where precise quantification proves impracticable. In a landmark judgment of 12 June 2023 (ECLI:ES:TS:2023:2475<\/a>), the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo<\/em>, TS) held that the characteristics of the truck cartel \u2013 its subject matter, participants, market coverage, duration and geographical scope \u2013 were sufficient to presume significant harm. However, the court considered an exact<\/em> quantification of that harm impossible. Referring to the CAT\u2019s reasoning in Royal Mail<\/em> and the limitations of the extensive and costly expert hearings conducted there, as well as to the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU, the TS thus estimated a \u201cminimum percentage of 5%<\/strong>\u201d of the costs of the affected lorries as the amount of harm.<\/p>\n\n

According to the TS, this minimum is both foreseeable<\/strong> and prudently set<\/strong> for a cartel of this nature. Defendants may, however, demonstrate that the actual harm was lower, while:<\/p>\n\n

\n

\u201cAs long as it is not proven that the amount of the damage was higher than the minimum percentage of 5%, the plaintiff cannot claim compensation in excess of that percentage.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Thus, the 5% overcharge serves as a lower bound<\/strong>, which injured parties may rely upon where they cannot prove a higher amount \u2013 e.g., because their economic expert reports, if any, are inadequate \u00a0(further details here<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

In fact, on 18 December 2025, the TS accepted a higher overcharge<\/strong> in another truck cartel case (ECLI:ES:TS:2025:5861<\/a>; s.a. this case report<\/a>). Upholding a judgment of the Court of Appeal of A Coru\u00f1a, the TS confirmed that the expert opinion of the plaintiff in that case convincingly demonstrated an overcharge of 16.35%, while the expert opinion of the defendant, which assumed \u201czero damages\u201d, was not credible in view of the facts established by the European Commission. The Appeal Court only applied a one\u2011third reduction to account for uncertainties in the plaintiff\u2019s report, arriving at a final overcharge of slightly above 10%<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n

Norway<\/em><\/p>\n\n

A similar approach is reflected in the ruling of the Borgarting lagmannsrett<\/em> of 17 March 2025, which also attracted some attention. This Norwegian appellate court found that the truck cartel had caused an overcharge of 10%<\/strong> of the chassis value for trucks purchased by Posten Bring, a state\u2011owned postal and logistics group, in Norway. For trucks purchased by subsidiaries in Sweden and Slovakia, the court set the overcharge at 5%<\/strong>, noting that Posten had supplied less evidence concerning those markets.<\/p>\n\n

Over the course of 34 hearing days, the court had examined testimony from 18 economic experts<\/strong>. The results of the various regression models diverged widely, and none produced a reliable conclusion, underscoring that econometric precision cannot be required where inherent data limitations make such models unstable or misleading. The court therefore aligned itself with the CAT\u2019s caution against \u201cspurious accuracy\u201d in Royal Mail<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n

Instead, the court assessed all available evidence \u2013 including the Commission\u2019s infringement decision, economic theory and cartel meta\u2011studies \u2013 and awarded Posten approximately NOK 117 million (around \u20ac10 million) plus interest in damages.<\/p>\n\n

Norway\u2019s Supreme Court declined to hear the defendants\u2019 appeals (for all of that, see this case report<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

German appeal court (Stuttgart, 2025): \u201cregular corridor of 5% to 25%\u201d cartel overcharge<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

The next significant development in this line of case law is the judgment<\/a> of the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht<\/em>, OLG) of Stuttgart of 20 November 2025. This decision is a must-read not only because it concerns a cartel other than the truck cartel (namely, the European bathroom fittings cartel<\/a>), but also because the OLG developed a comprehensive model<\/strong> for estimating cartel overcharges and pass\u2011on.<\/p>\n\n

Like the other courts discussed above, the OLG expressed fundamental doubts about the suitability of regression analyses and other economic models (e.g. cost-based price control) for quantifying cartel\u2011induced harm in legal disputes. Requiring such analyses in every case, the court noted, would make the enforcement of damages claims excessively difficult. Gathering the necessary data is contentious, complex, time\u2011consuming and costly \u2013 without guaranteeing a clear or reliable outcome. The court emphasised that the \u201cinevitable degree of uncertainty<\/strong>\u201d in establishing the hypothetical competitive price must not<\/em> be borne by the injured parties, since that uncertainty stems directly from the illegal collusion.<\/p>\n\n

Therefore, relying on Article 17(1) of Directive 2014\/104, the OLG reaffirmed the court\u2019s power to estimate harm<\/strong>. To do so, it developed a \u201cmethodologically independent<\/strong>\u201d and structured five\u2011step test aimed at ensuring a realistic and procedurally efficient quantification, based on economic meta\u2011studies, empirically validated principles and the facts of the specific case. By establishing such a framework, the OLG reduces evidentiary burdens while maintaining analytical structure and transparency in judicial damage estimation. The five steps are:<\/p>\n\n

    \n
  1. Establishing the existence of an antitrust\u2011related price effect<\/strong>, i.e., an overcharge (taking into account the presumption of cartel\u2011induced harm);<\/li>\n\n
  2. Classifying the overcharge within an \u201cestimation corridor<\/strong>;\u201d<\/li>\n\n
  3. Refining the estimate<\/strong> within that corridor through a detailed assessment of relevant factors (including aspects of the collusion, how it was organised, market conditions, and demand);<\/li>\n\n
  4. Assessing pass\u2011on of the overcharge to the claimant (where the claimant is an indirect purchaser<\/strong>); and<\/li>\n\n
  5. Considering the passing\u2011on defence<\/strong>. This involves determining whether the defence fails from the outset \u2013 in line with the case law of the Federal Court of Justice \u2013 as its acceptance would effectively eliminate the defendants\u2019 liability in circumstances where indirect customers are not expected to bring their own claims, such as in cases of dispersed damages (as in the present case before the OLG).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n

    The second step is particularly important in the present context (for a broader case review, see here<\/a>). According to the OLG, once a price effect has been established, it can generally be assumed that the overcharge at the first market level (i.e., in transactions between cartelists and their direct customers) falls \u201ctypically within a regular corridor of 5% to 25%<\/strong>\u201d of the price paid. This range corresponds to a standard deviation of 10 percentage points around the reference value of 15%<\/strong>, which economic meta\u2011studies<\/strong> (Connor<\/a>, Oxera<\/a>, Smuda<\/a>, Boyer\/Kotchoni<\/a>) identify as a conservative median of cartel\u2011induced price increases in Europe. This reinforces that the corridor is grounded not in abstraction but in empirical reality. Germany\u2019s Federal Court of Justice has also accepted the 15% figure as a lump\u2011sum benchmark for cartel damages under standard business terms (as in Rails Cartel VI<\/em><\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

    The \u201cregular corridor\u201d does not prevent courts from estimating damages outside this range in exceptional cases. However, such deviations should be rare, especially with regard to the lower limit. As the OLG explained:<\/p>\n\n

    \n

    \u201cThe lower value of 5% appears plausible and economically sound in the case of a cartel where, according to the first stage of assessment, a significant price effect can be assumed with a high degree of probability. It can therefore serve as a basis for estimating minimum damage if the circumstances of the case allow sufficient conclusions to be drawn about the occurrence of damage, but doubts remain as to whether it falls within the lower corridor (less than 5%).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

    The OLG expressly allowed an appeal to the Federal Court of Justice.<\/p>\n\n

    In parallel: the \u201ccompensation bracket\u201d in Dieselgate (CJEU, 2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

    Starting point: Germany<\/em><\/p>\n\n

    In the context of the so\u2011called diesel emissions scandal (Dieselgate<\/em>), the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof<\/em>, BGH) had already applied the idea of channelling compensation for breaches of EU law into a defined estimation range, on its own initiative and in an even stricter manner. This illustrates that the underlying normative rationale is not sector\u2011specific but flows from the general EU\u2011law requirement of effectiveness<\/strong>, especially in terms of deterrence.<\/p>\n\n

    Following the CJEU\u2019s Mercedes\u2011Benz Group<\/em> ruling of 2023 (C-100\/21<\/a>), the BGH held in a judgment of 26 June 2023<\/a> that the purchaser of a motor vehicle equipped with a defeat device prohibited under EU law \u2013 namely, Regulation (EC) No 715\/2007 and Directive 2007\/46\/EC (Framework Directive) \u2013 may claim damages under national law for having bought the vehicle at a price higher than would have been paid absent the infringement. The amount of the damage is to be assessed by the trial judge. However, according to the BGH, the loss could never<\/strong> be below<\/strong> 5%<\/strong> nor exceed<\/strong> 15%<\/strong> of the purchase price.<\/p>\n\n

    The BGH justified this range by normative grounds, referring to the \u201crequirements of EU law\u201d identified by the CJEU: sanctions for a violation of the relevant EU provisions must be \u201ceffective, proportionate and dissuasive<\/strong>\u201d. Damages exceeding 15% would be disproportionate in cases involving illegal defeat devices, which the BGH described as \u201cobjectively comparatively minor\u201d infringements. At the same time, the lower limit of 5%<\/strong> is justified by the preventive function<\/strong> of damages and, therefore, the effectiveness principle:<\/p>\n\n

    \n

    \u201cFor reasons of effectiveness under EU law, the estimated damage cannot be less than 5% of the purchase price paid. [\u2026] The damage estimation must lead to a sanction that is also tangible for the vehicle manufacturer in terms of amount. [\u2026] It is sufficient if, on the one hand, each sanction taken individually is associated with a not insignificant loss in relation to the manufacturer\u2019s earnings associated with the transaction and, on the other hand, the sanctions for many legal infringements as a whole can bring about a change in behaviour in terms of compliance with all legal acts. This is the case with a lower assessment limit for damages of 5% of the purchase price paid.\u201d<\/p>\n\n

    (Omissions added)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

    Confirmation in Austria<\/em><\/p>\n\n

    The BGH\u2019s reasoning has been expressly adopted in Austria. In a decision of 28 September 2023<\/a>, the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof<\/em>) confirmed that adequate compensation<\/em> for Dieselgate cases lies within a range of 5% (\u201cas the lower limit for reasons of effectiveness under EU law\u201d) and 15% (\u201cas the upper limit for reasons of proportionality under EU law\u201d) of the price paid, \u201ceven disregarding the evidence submitted by the party (e.g. expert opinions).\u201d<\/p>\n\n

    Approval by the European Court of Justice<\/em><\/p>\n\n

    Soon thereafter, a lower German court referred the issue back to the CJEU. The referring court questioned whether a blanket 5-15% range might violate the effectiveness principle, given that the reduction in vehicle value caused by defeat devices would often exceed the schematic upper limit of 15%.<\/p>\n\n

    In its judgment of 1 August 2025 (C-666\/23)<\/a>, the CJEU essentially confirmed the BGH\u2019s approach. It reiterated that sanctions for violations of EU law must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive<\/em>. On that basis alone, the Court held:<\/p>\n\n

    \n

    \u201c[104] [T]he determination by a Member State of such a compensation bracket<\/strong>, consisting of a minimum and a maximum percentage of the purchase price, with a view to fixing the amount of adequate compensation which the purchaser of the vehicle concerned must receive, cannot, as a matter of principle, be regarded as contrary to EU law either, provided that<\/strong> that bracket does not lead to inadequate compensation\u00a0for the loss or damage suffered by the purchaser of a vehicle fitted with a defeat device. [\u2026]<\/p>\n

    [106]\u00a0 It is for the referring court to ascertain whether or not the compensation bracket [\u2026] makes it practically impossible or excessively difficult [for the claimants] to obtain adequate compensation<\/strong> for the loss or damage suffered.\u201d<\/p>\n

    (emphasis, omissions, and clarification in square brackets added)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

    This means that EU law does not preclude<\/strong> the establishment of a minimum percentage <\/em>\u2013 such as 5% \u2013 when estimating damages. At the same time, compensation must not<\/strong> be capped at a level that fails to provide adequate reparation for the harm actually suffered. In short, the CJEU endorses the principle of minimum damages<\/strong> for reasons of effectiveness.<\/p>\n\n

    The wheel turns full circle: back to both the truck cartel and Stuttgart<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

    At first glance, the marketing of a car fitted with an illegal defeat device and conduct prohibited under competition law may appear unrelated. Yet in both situations, the infringements give rise to claims for compensation under EU law for the financial losses suffered. This raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the Dieselgate case law also applies in cartel cases (for this, see already here<\/a>), especially in light of the above\u2011mentioned decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court (TS) and the \u201cregular corridor\u201d approach taken by the Stuttgart OLG.<\/p>\n\n

    Indeed, the Regional Court (Landgericht<\/em>, LG) of Stuttgart has provided a convincing answer in a series of 2025 judgments concerning the truck cartel. In its decision of 27 February 2025<\/a>, for example, the LG held (emphasis added):<\/p>\n\n

    \n

    \u201c[437] In the present case, the reasons of effectiveness under EU law also require a minimum damage of 5%<\/strong>. Cartel damages are not only subject to an estimate [pursuant to Section 287 of the German Code of Civil Procedure], but their effective enforcement and assessment are also required by primary law and laid down in Articles 4 and 17(1) of Directive 2014\/104 (see also its Recitals 3 and 45). It can be<\/strong> left open whether, in this case or in general in actions for antitrust damages, there is a need for a normative limitation of the discretion to estimate damages<\/strong> in accordance with the case law of the BGH in the \u2018diesel scandal\u2019 case in the sense of a minimum damage threshold ([reference to the BGH judgment of 26 June 2023 mentioned above]). Nevertheless, it can be stated that the requirement for an \u2018effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction<\/strong>\u2019 laid down in Article 46 of the Framework Directive and Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715\/2007 does not constitute a special feature of illegal defeat devices. Rather, violations of EU law are generally to be sanctioned in this way, including in competition law (see Kr\u00fcger, Mit Voll(ab)gas zum kartellrechtlichen Mindestschaden?<\/em>, Neue Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Kartellrecht [NZKart] 2024, p. 152 [\u2026]). Claims for damages serve not only to compensate private parties for damages, but also the public interest in the practical effectiveness<\/strong> of Article 101 TFEU and Section 1 [German] Competition Act ([reference to, e.g., CJEU, judgment of 6 October 2021, C\u2011882\/19, Sumal<\/em><\/a>, paras. 34 et seqq.]). Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the prevention objective<\/strong> (which also characterises antitrust damages) has long been recognised as a factor in assessing compensation for non\u2011material damages.\u201d<\/p>\n\n

    (emphasis, omissions, and clarifications in square brackets added)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

    Comment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

    First<\/strong>, it must be stressed that assuming minimum damages does not give claimants carte blanche<\/em>. The prerequisite remains that the occurrence of harm caused by the competition law infringement must first be established. This is consistent across all the case law discussed above.<\/p>\n\n

    Second<\/strong>, the CJEU\u2019s 2025 Dieselgate ruling reiterates that financial compensation for a breach of EU law must be adequate<\/em>. This means the harm actually suffered must be made good in full<\/em> under national rules (see already the 1993 CJEU\u2019s Marshall<\/em><\/a> judgment, paras. 26 et seqq.). The same principle applies to infringements of EU competition law (see Article 3 of Directive 2014\/104). As the Stuttgart LG notes, damages must also comply with the requirement that sanctions be effective, proportionate and dissuasive<\/em>. Against this background, the reasoning of various national courts which \u2013 within their power to estimate the harm (see Article 17(1) Directive 2014\/104) \u2013 have set a lower threshold for cartel damages appears conclusive.<\/p>\n\n

    Third<\/strong>, an overcharge of 5%<\/em> of the purchase price paid marks a widely accepted and reasonably conservative lower bound for minimum damages, at least in cases of hardcore infringements such as cartels. Plaintiffs remain free to claim higher amounts<\/em> if they can sufficiently substantiate them, for example through robust economic analysis. Therefore, despite judicial scepticism towards complex econometric models, expert input remains valuable.<\/p>\n\n

    Fourth<\/strong>, conversely, an overcharge of less than 5%<\/em> can only be justified in exceptional circumstances and only where it is beyond doubt. No credible analysis may point to an equally high or higher overcharge. This reflects the very purpose of minimum damages within the framework of adequate compensation.<\/p>\n\n

    Moreover, minimum damages are not solely compensatory but also aim to ensure full compliance with the law. In the Mercedes\u2011Benz Group<\/em> ruling \u2013 on which the BGH built its compensation bracket \u2013 the CJEU made the avoidance of unjust enrichment (i.e., over-compensation) expressly \u201csubject to\u201d the effectiveness principle of EU law (paras. 93-94<\/a>). From a broader effectiveness perspective, assessing the lower limit for cartel damages may therefore also require taking into account the considerable obstacles faced by many claimants, such as the asymmetry of confronting multiple, often economically powerful defendants and numerous experts. Viewed from this angle as well, a minimum overcharge of 5%<\/strong> is both justified<\/strong> and, if anything, conservative<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n

    By Carsten Kr\u00fcger<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Courts throughout Europe increasingly adopt a minimum damages approach in antitrust cases, unanimously presuming at least a 5% overcharge, driven by grounds of compensation, effectiveness and deterrence. Recent judgments \u2013 from the CAT (UK) to the Spanish Supreme Court, Norway\u2019s courts, the Court of Appeal in Stuttgart, the Dieselgate rulings of the German and Austrian Supreme Courts, and finally the European Court of Justice \u2013 point to a converging practice and a structured approach to quantifying damages across the EU.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":20,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[57,55,64,53,52,63,50,43,40,38,37,36,62],"tags":[],"coauthors":[120],"class_list":["post-11287","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cartels","category-cjeu","category-competition-law","category-economics","category-efta","category-eu-law","category-germany","category-norway","category-private-enforcement","category-quantification","category-spain","category-trucks-cartel","category-united-kingdom"],"yoast_head":"\nA 5% Overcharge as Minimum Damages for Antitrust Violations?! Recent Developments in Europe - CDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/carteldamageclaims.com\/de\/2026\/01\/21\/a-5-overcharge-as-minimum-damages-for-antitrust-violations-recent-developments-in-europe\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"de_DE\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A 5% Overcharge as Minimum Damages for Antitrust Violations?! Recent Developments in Europe - CDC\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Courts throughout Europe increasingly adopt a minimum damages approach in antitrust cases, unanimously presuming at least a 5% overcharge, driven by grounds of compensation, effectiveness and deterrence. 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