Courts throughout Europe increasingly adopt a minimum damages approach in antitrust cases, unanimously presuming at least a 5% overcharge, driven by grounds of compensation, effectiveness and deterrence. Recent judgments – from the CAT (UK) to the Spanish Supreme Court, Norway’s courts, the Court of Appeal in Stuttgart, the Dieselgate rulings of the German and Austrian Supreme Courts, and finally the European Court of Justice – point to a converging practice and a structured approach to quantifying damages across the EU.
Spanish Supreme Court confirms overcharge in excess of 10% in the trucks cartel: key takeaways from judgment STS 5861/2025
The Supreme Court Judgment STS 5861/2025 of 18 December 2025 represents a significant development in damages litigation arising from the trucks cartel in Spain. The Supreme Court has fully dismissed the appeals brought by Renault Trucks S.A.S., reinforcing a clear judicial trend towards an effective and adequate compensation of anticompetitive harm, based on the facts […]
Dairy Cartel – the next level of private antitrust enforcement: Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid finds a 9.4% undercharge
On 16 October 2025, Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid delivered a judgment[1] of notable relevance in the well-known Spanish Dairy Cartel case. The decision, issued by Judge Ms Carmen González Suárez in Ordinary Proceedings No. 588/2022, partially upheld a private damage claim brought against Grupo Lactalis Iberia, S.A. (Lactalis) and Industrias Lácteas de Granada, […]
Minimum Damages under EU Law in Antitrust Damages Actions? Conclusions from the Recent Case Law of the German Supreme Court
The estimated damage cannot be less than 5% of the purchase price paid for reasons of effectiveness under EU law.” This was recently stated by the German Federal Court of Justice about claims for damages due to the Dieselgate scandal. However, the Court’s reasoning in favour of this legal lower limit for damages might equally, if not even more so, be applied to cartel damages claims – an analysis.
Decoding Transaction Data in Private Competition Law Damage Litigations: Efficient data management in legal proceedings
In private damage litigations, the effective management of transaction data stands as a pivotal element in building compelling cases. Transaction data plays a central role in the substantiation of a claim, establishing causation, quantifying damages, and pre-emptively addressing defence strategies.
The intricacies of transaction data management present unique challenges, from handling extensive paper-based evidence to ensuring data relevance, integrity, and compliance with data protection regulations. This article explores the complexities of transaction data management within competition law litigations, offering insight into best practices and the evolving landscape of data management technologies.
Tribunal Supremo on trucks cartel, judicial estimation after Tráficos Manuel Ferrer: Judges can estimate without prior disclosure, judicial estimate of 5% overcharge confirmed
In a bundle of 15 cassation judgments, the Tribunal Supremo, the highest civil court in Spain, rules on important questions concerning the ability of the judge to estimate the damage, the need for prior inter partes disclosure, proportionality, and standards for economic expert opinions. The Tribunal does so against the background of the European trucks cartel, the same case that prompted the preliminary ruling in Tráficos Manuel Ferrer. The Tribunal largely upholds the findings of the appellate courts and strengthens the ability of judges to estimate damage. The court also rules, among other questions, on the accrual of interest and limitation.
Challenges in Quantifying Private Antitrust Damages: Addressing Data Availability and Reliability
This article explores the complexities surrounding the quantification of damages and the issue of data asymmetry in private antitrust damage actions in Europe. It delves into the challenges claimants face in quantifying the actual harm caused by anticompetitive behaviour. The article also discusses the role of disclosure rules in promoting fair access to evidence and proposes potential solutions to mitigate the information disparity between claimants and defendants.
Tráficos Manuel Ferrer – a warning to claimants and defendants alike
Shortly after the publication of the Tráficos Manuel Ferrer judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in response to a request for a preliminary ruling (16 February 2023), the judge from the Valencia court who had referred the questions to the CJEU delivered his judgment in the same case (10 March 2023). This blog post analyses the key points of the Valencia court judgment concerning economic expert reports.
Connor and Lande data: median recovery rates suggest that cartel effects can be five times higher than cartel fines
Many cartels remain undetected by competition authorities. Even if detected, the estimated negative effects of price-fixing cartels on prices can be five times larger than the fines imposed by the authorities. That is, the level of fines is suboptimal. The analysis is based on the dataset of Connor and Lande. It partially contradicts the results of a recent study that suggests effective recovery of cartel injuries when cartels are discovered.
German Federal Court of Justice confirms factual assumption of harm in case of anticompetitive information exchanges and clarifies scope of liability in multi-product cartels
On 5 January 2023, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) published an important judgment in relation to follow-on damage actions relating to the so-called German drugstore products cartel (Case KZR 42/20). In its ruling, Germany’s highest civil court also confirmed a factual presumption of harm in the case of anticompetitive information exchanges. This is an important clarification as the BGH had thus far only acknowledged such factual presumption in cases of price-fixing and market-sharing practices. In addition, the BGH clarified that cartel participants are jointly and severally liable for damages caused in relation to products they do not manufacture themselves if they were aware that the anticompetitive practices extended to the other products.