Many cartels remain undetected by competition authorities. Even if detected, the estimated negative effects of price-fixing cartels on prices can be five times larger than the fines imposed by the authorities. That is, the level of fines is suboptimal. The analysis is based on the dataset of Connor and Lande. It partially contradicts the results of a recent study that suggests effective recovery of cartel injuries when cartels are discovered.
Assessing the compatibility of seemingly contradictory statistical evidence in the case of damage estimations (reflections on the article written by Peter Bönisch and Roman Inderst)
In a recent publication, Peter Bönisch and Roman Inderst tackle the delicate issue of the evaluation of seemingly contradictory econometric evidence. Introducing the concept of severity measures, they propose a method to avoid the common obstacles plaguing the interpretation of seemingly conflicting empirical evidence through the practical example of financial damage estimation in follow-on cases. This blog post discusses the ideas presented in the paper.
Antitrust Damages in the Ad-Tech Sector
On 22 June 2021, the European Commission confirmed the opening of a formal antitrust investigation into whether Google previously abused or is currently abusing its dominant position in the online intermediation of programmatic display advertising business. Prior to the Commission’s announcement, the French Competition Authority (FCA) had already handed down a decision on 7 July 2021, including a EUR 220 million fine, finding that Google breached Article 102 TFEU and the French Competition Act in the same advertisement sector.
Les dommages et intérêts dans les affaires de position dominante : l’exemple de Google Shopping
Si une multitude d’actions en réparation sont régulièrement déposées devant les juridictions de divers pays de l’Union européenne en rapport avec l’article 101 TFUE (pensez, par exemple, à l’abondance des litiges contre les constructeurs de camions), il n’en va pas encore de même pour les affaires d’abus de position dominante. Bien que la Directive régissant […]
Paris Court of Appeal provides guidance on damage estimation in competition law cases and awards EUR 250 million in damages
Orange Caraïbe et al. vs Digicel Antilles Françaises Guyane On 17 June 2020, the Paris Court of Appeal (Court) delivered its judgment (Orange judgment) in which it ordered Orange to pay EUR 249.5 million (EUR 181.5 million in damages plus EUR 68 million in interest) to Digicel Antilles and Guyana, following the implementation by the […]
Private damages in dominance cases: the example of Google Shopping
While a plethora of damages claims are regularly filed in front of jurisdictions in various countries of the European Union related to Article 101 TFEU (think, for example, the abundance of litigation against truck manufacturers), the same is not yet true for abuse of dominance cases. Notwithstanding that the Damages Directive is equally applicable to […]
Spanish Trucks Cartel Litigation: Temporal application of EU Damages Directive provisions on limitation and quantification of harm
In the aftermath of Directive 2014/104/EU (Directive), Spain appears to be one of the most active jurisdictions dealing with antitrust damages cases. In particular, a multitude of Spanish courts have been seized with actions for compensation in relation to the European Trucks Cartel (Case AT.39824-Trucks). In that context, preliminary ruling requests were addressed by Spanish […]
Amsterdam Court of Appeal applies Cogeco principles on limitation periods and confirms validity of assignments in Sodium Chlorate cartel case
Introduction On 4 February 2020 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in a landmark judgment ruled that the claims brought by CDC against Kemira Chemicals Oy (‘Kemira Chemicals’) under Finnish, Swedish and Spanish law are not time-barred. The Court of Appeal is the first national appeals court to apply the Cogeco principles on limitation periods as formulated in 2019 by […]
Review of economic publication ‘Cartel Dating’
The recent publication on the determination of the period of actual collusive effects by Boswijk, Bun, & Schinkel (“BBS”) is rather timely given the upsurge in private antitrust enforcement across Europe since the introduction of the EU Damages Directive (“Directive”) and its subsequent implementation into Member State law. Background – The Right to Full Compensation The Directive acknowledges the […]