Our Innovations

Out innovations

Innovation is seeing

what everybody has

seen and thinking what

nobody has thought.

Innovation is seeing what everybody has seen and thinking what nobody has thought.

Our Innovations

CDC Cartel Damage Claims has been a leader in obtaining compensation for competition law infringements since 2002. Contributing to our success are our innovative solutions for antitrust claims and the ongoing development of new projects and strategies that provide the greatest value for damages companies. Three examples of our innovations and projects include:

CDC pioneered the method of aggregating claims from multiple damaged companies into one legal action. We then take this bundled claim to court in our own name and at our own cost and risk. This innovative solution has ever since been known by experts as the “CDC Bundling Model”. Other players entering the market in more recent times attempt to copy this model.

Our bundling model helps to overcome the considerable information asymmetries that exist between cartelists and damaged companies. This aggregated approach enables compensation claims based on market-wide data while simultaneously ensuring that competition rules are respected. The data and information gathered from damaged companies remain securely and confidentially stored in CDC’s possession.

Through our bundling model, CDC obtains access to detailed market-wide information on the supply and demand characteristics of the market in question. This includes specific data such as prices, rebates, discounts, delivery costs, purchasing contracts and product or service specifications. We use this data to create a clean and comprehensive database capturing all relevant aspects of the market. A database as such is fundamental to antitrust claims and individual claimants often lack the ability or data to compile such a market-wide database, particularly in relation to Europe-wide infringements. Our integrated approach of bundling strengthens the bargaining power in negotiations and increases pressure on cartelists to provide full compensation for the harm caused.

The Leniency PLUS+® programme created by CDC allows damaged companies to obtain optimum compensation as quickly as possible while providing cartel members cooperating with CDC an effective solution to reduce their risk exposure associated with antitrust damages claims.

Under Leniency PLUS+®, one or more members of the cartel in question pay(s) a reduced amount of compensation to CDC in exchange for information and data, enabling CDC to obtain compensation more easily and quickly from the other members of that cartel. An essential element of Leniency PLUS+® is CDC’s commitment not to pursue further legal action against the member(s) of the cartel that cooperate with CDC.

Facilitated through the acquisition of claims from numerous damaged companies, we are able to offer cartel members who wish to benefit from Leniency PLUS+® a reduction of their financial exposure while allowing damaged companies to obtain optimum compensation as quickly as possible. CDC can also provide mechanisms by which cartel members can hedge their risks. In negotiating and structuring complex multi-million settlements, CDC has gained a valuable reputation as a trusted settlement partner among cartel members and their advisors.

Cartel members – whether they choose to cooperate with the competition authorities through leniency programmes or not – can therefore minimise their financial exposure from private damage actions by approaching CDC and benefiting from its Leniency PLUS+® programme.

In 2014, CDC commissioned an independent and detailed study on the calculation of interest on antitrust damages. The study was conducted by the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The objective of this study was to serve as a benchmark and reference in cross border cases, particularly in the field of interest calculation for damages caused by cartels.

The study offers a systematic and practical account of interest rules in several European jurisdictions to all parties involved in complex cross border litigation. Additionally, it provides judges and lawmakers with analyses and recommendations for the proper application of interest rules and advice on principles that should inform effective implementation of the Damages Directive.

If national and EU standards were established in a similar vein, certain challenges in calculating interest, particularly in cross-border compensation proceedings, could be considerably alleviated. This would enable the development of standardised software to be utilised by affected parties and the judiciary to quickly and accurately calculate interest on damages relating to breaches of competition rules across multiple jurisdictions. Outlined in the study are recommendations on how to overcome existing hurdles which have slowed down private antitrust enforcement across the EU.