On 16 October 2025, Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid delivered a judgment[1] of notable relevance in the well-known Spanish Dairy Cartel case. The decision, issued by Judge Ms Carmen González Suárez in Ordinary Proceedings No. 588/2022, partially upheld a private damage claim brought against Grupo Lactalis Iberia, S.A. (Lactalis) and Industrias Lácteas de Granada, S.L.U. (Puleva), recognising their participation in a collusive agreement that affected the Spanish national market for the supply of raw milk between 2000 and 2013.
The Court found that the defendants engaged in a systematic exchange of commercially sensitive information leading to price-fixing, allocation of farmers (suppliers), and control of surpluses, thereby infringing Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Act (Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, LDC). Unlike most cartel cases, where producers or suppliers of a certain product are engaged in anti-competitive agreements, the Dairy Cartel concerns antitrust practices conducted by the buyers, namely the companies buying raw milk, who aimed at achieving a cheaper supply by preventing farmers from negotiating prices on fair terms.
This judgment represents a significant step forward in consolidating civil actions arising from such kind of anti-competitive practices. It also establishes important criteria regarding the statute of limitations, the quantification of damages, and the application of compensatory and default interest.
The Court accepted the methodology of the claimant’s experts and found a 9.4% undercharge in the raw milk market
At the heart of this case lies the assessment and quantification of harm caused by the buyers’ cartel, which is an exceptional scenario in competition law. Unlike a traditional sellers’ cartel, where undertakings collude to raise prices or restrict output, a buyers’ cartel involves coordination among purchasers to depress input prices. In this instance, major dairy processors exchanged sensitive commercial information and agreed on purchasing strategies to keep the prices paid to farmers artificially low.
On the quantification of harm, the Court rejected a mere judicial estimation[2], and instead, conducted a detailed technical assessment of the economic expert evidence submitted. The judgment, with certain qualifications, accepted the methodology of the claimant’s experts, considering it the most robust and coherent from an econometric perspective.
The Court’s analysis focused on the price undercharge, that is, the mirror image of the classic “overcharge” observed in sellers’ cartels. A buyers’ cartel pushes prices downward below what would have prevailed in a properly functioning market with a fairer balance of bargaining power between suppliers and buyers. This leads to a distorted distribution of resources and profits between the suppliers and the purchasers undermining the competitive process. In this case, the farmers suppling raw milk could have obtained a higher price absent the cartel, which would have supported more efficient competitive dynamics in Spain’s raw-milk market enhancing the viability of the farmers’ operations. However, the coordinated purchasing behaviour of the cartelists prevented that outcome. Accordingly, the undercharge represents the difference between the prices actually received by the farmers and those that would have prevailed under competitive conditions. Two complementary methods were employed: oligopolistic simulations and Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis.
The simulations assessed competition in prices and quantities (Bertrand and Cournot models), considering the market shares of the participants according to CNMC data. The results indicated prices between 8.6% and 13.9% lower for transactions involving cartel members, and between 7.3% and 9.6% lower for non-members as a consequence of the umbrella effect. The DiD analysis, comparing price trends in Spain with unaffected markets (Portugal and Italy) during and after the infringement period, revealed prices between 9.4% and 11% lower. The consistency between both methods reinforced the robustness of the conclusions. Both approaches incorporated controls relating to the Consumer Price Index, import levels, and milk quality, as well as sensitivity analyses to test the reliability of results.
However, because the claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence, the Court limited the affected volume of commerce to sales made directly to the cartel participants, excluding potential umbrella effects. As noted, this limitation was due to the lack of adequate evidence, not to a finding that such effects did not occur. In other words, the Judge did not question the general validity of the umbrella effect but concluded that the evidence presented in this case was insufficient to substantiate their occurrence.
Exercising discretion, the Judge ultimately fixed the level of undercharge at 9.4%, adopting the lower bound of the range estimated by the claimant, as the mid-point proposed by the experts was deemed insufficiently justified.
This finding is particularly noteworthy as it provides a judicially endorsed quantification of harm in a buyers’ cartel context, an area where economic methodologies and legal reasoning have historically been underdeveloped. By validating the use of advanced econometric tools such as simulation models and DiD analysis, the judgment sets an important precedent for future private enforcement actions in Spain.
The limitation period had not yet begun to run while judicial review proceedings remain pending
Regarding the statute of limitations, the Madrid Court applies the recent Supreme Court doctrine on the computation of limitation periods in antitrust damages cases. Referring to the Supreme Court judgments 889/2025 of 5 June 2025 and 2857/2025 of 17 June 2025, issued concerning the Envelopes Cartel, the Madrid Court rejected the argument that the limitation period began to run upon the mere publication of the administrative infringement decision.
Rather, in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, judgment of 22 June 2022, Case C-267/20, AB Volvo and DAF Trucks NV v RM) and the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in the Sugar Cartel case (STS 408/2012), the initial point for the running of time must be the date on which the administrative decision becomes final.
In the present case, the CNMC (Spanish National Competition Authority) Decision has been appealed by its addressees, and some appeals are still pending, including those filed by Lactalis and Puleva, who were the defendants in the case at hand. The Court held that the limitation period for private damage claims had not yet begun to run. However, even if reference were made to the CNMC’s 2019 Decision and limitation had not been interrupted, the five-year period provided for in Article 10 of Directive 2014/104/EU and Article 74.1 of the LDC would still render the action brought in November 2022 within the statutory term.
The Court treats the claim as a stand-alone action
Another relevant aspect of the judgment is the characterisation of the relevant claim as a stand-alone action. The Court carried out an autonomous and comprehensive assessment of the existence of collusive conduct, based on the evidentiary material produced in the civil proceedings, given that the CNMC Decision is not yet final. However, the Decision already holds significant evidential value and persuasive weight under the national rules of evidence.
This interpretation aligns with the recent CJEU case-law (Case C-21/24, CP v Nissan Iberia), which establishes that the limitation period for damages actions arising from infringements of competition law cannot begin while the Decision of the competition authority remains under judicial review. In doing so, the Madrid Court takes the view that, where appeals are still pending, the action must be considered independent, without prejudice to the fact that the appealed administrative decision retains qualified evidential value. This approach has considerable practical significance, as it provides legal certainty in numerous disputes arising from non-final decisions of the national competition authority.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of certain defendants, making the Decision final for them
Three appeals against the CNMC Decision lodged with the Supreme Court by parties other than the defendants in Madrid have been dismissed. The CNMC Decision has thus become final with respect to Central Lechera de Galicia, S.L. (Celega), Corporación Alimentaria Peñasanta, S.A. (CAPSA), and Nestlé España, S.A. (Nestlé).
Other appeals are still pending. This includes the following addresses of the CNMC Decision: Puleva, Lactalis, Danone, S.A. (Danone), and Calidad Pascual, S.A. (Pascual). Consequently, for these undertakings, the CNMC Decision cannot yet be regarded as final.
In proceedings for damages, this distinction entails that, for Celega, CAPSA and Nestlé, the findings and conclusions of the CNMC Decision have a fully binding effect and may be relied upon as final determinations of fact and law in subsequent civil or administrative proceedings. By contrast, in the case of Puleva, Lactalis, Danone and Pascual, where there is not yet finality, the sanctioning decision still serves as a “highly authoritative instrument of conviction”, considering its technical rigour and the extensive evidentiary material on which it is based.
The judgment distinguishes between compensatory, default, and procedural interest, applying compound interest throughout in line with Supreme Court doctrine
The judgment further provides a detailed distinction between the various types of interest applicable to compensation.
- First, it recognises compensatory interest, designed to update the damage and calculate it in accordance with the statutory interest rate, with annual compound capitalisation from each affected payment until the filing of the claim.
- Secondly, it applies default interest, pursuant to Article 1108 of the Civil Code, from the date of filing of the claim until the date of judgment.
- Finally, it grants procedural interest, as provided in Article 576 of the Civil Procedure Act, from the date of judgment until full payment of the compensation.
This treatment of interest is consistent with the consolidated doctrine of the Supreme Court in the Envelopes Cartel case (SSTS 889/2025 and 971/2025), reinforcing the compensatory function of compound interest, intended to restore the opportunity cost of money over extended periods.
The judgment marks a milestone in Spain’s antitrust damages regime
Overall, the judgment of Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid decisively strengthens the private enforcement of competition law. Its contribution is twofold: on the one hand, it consolidates the evidential value of a national competition authority’s decision, which, although it cannot be regarded as fully final while under appeal by some, retains significant probative weight where additional elements enable the Court to conduct its own assessment of the infringement; and on the other hand, it legitimises the use of advanced econometric methodologies, such as oligopolistic simulations and DiD analyses, as reliable tools for quantifying harm.
The case is particularly noteworthy as it concerns a buyers’ cartel, which is a relatively rare form of collusive conduct where purchasers, rather than sellers, coordinate to depress input prices. By recognising and quantifying the resulting harm to suppliers, the judgment broadens the practical scope of antitrust damages actions, demonstrating that competition law protects not only consumers from overcharges but also suppliers from artificially imposed undercharges.
Furthermore, the judgment confirms the general rule of compound interest capitalisation in actions for damages arising from infringements of competition law and clarifies the computation of limitation periods, linking them to the moment when the administrative decision becomes final.
In sum, this judicial pronouncement marks a new milestone in the development of antitrust damages regime, contributing methodological coherence, legal certainty, and predictability for economic operators and courts dealing with claims arising from collusive conduct of a similar nature.
By Carsten Krüger and Amelia Mora González
[1] The judgment has not yet been published in any official source. However, we were able to access it through the publication made on the website of Hitchings & González, available here.
[2] “Judicial estimation” refers to the Court’s determination of damages based on approximations rather than precise calculations, typically used when proof of harm is difficult or impossible to establish. Judges do not always undertake detailed technical evaluations of economic evidence, especially when that evidence is incomplete, imprecise, or insufficient for an exact calculation.
