For those sceptical about the potential of big data-based market screening in cartel detection, the recent judgment of the EU General Court in Michelin (Case T-188/24, ‘Judgment’) may offer some encouragement. The case concerns an appeal by European tyre manufacturer Michelin challenging the European Commission’s decision that requires the investigated companies (tyre manufacturers) to submit to an inspection as per Article 20(4) of Regulation 1/2003. While the judgment itself may not be particularly remarkable, it provides valuable insight into the Commission’s evolving methods for identifying potential anti-competitive behaviour through data-driven market-screening techniques.
The Commission’s Market-Screening Techniques
Paragraphs 91-104 of the Judgment describe the methodology used by the Commission to identify suspicious behaviour in the tyre industry. The Commission conducted a quantitative analysis of hundreds of thousands of public earnings calls across various sectors using key bigrams (word pairs) to detect strategic language that could signal collusion. The tyre sector stood out for its high frequency of such language. A qualitative (manual) review then assessed the context of those calls, helping the Commission identify specific public statements by tyre manufacturers that might reflect anti-competitive coordination. The Court found this dual analysis reasonable.
In paragraphs 105-123, the Court evaluates whether the Commission’s findings amounted to sufficiently serious indications of coordination. The Commission had collected multiple public statements by tyre manufacturers during earnings calls in which companies expressed their pricing strategies or intentions. The Commission stated that such statements did not meet standard behaviour observed in other sectors. These included phrases like “we want to send a signal” or “we plan to” which could suggest indirect communication with competitors. Further, the Commission observed that the manufacturers’ statements about price increases were often aligned with rises in raw material and energy costs. Likewise, statements discouraging price reductions coincided with decreases in those input costs (para 117). The Court held that these could plausibly be interpreted as attempts to signal pricing behaviour.
An interesting debate between Michelin and the Commission concerns whether the statements made during earnings calls are justified and merely reflect price pressures in the context of inflation and a pricing policy linked to premium positioning (para 124). The Commission, however, pointed out that, among other things, wholesale prices were discussed during the calls (para 130), adding that all prices charged along the value chain are relevant. Furthermore, according to the Commission, the statements made during the earnings calls reflect more general guidance from headquarters, which likely influenced pricing throughout the value chain (para 132). The Court acknowledged that the correctness of the Commission’s interpretation – and, in particular, whether other credible justifications exist for the statements made during earnings calls – is to be determined at a later stage in the proceedings.
A Warning for Other Markets
Michelin noted that earnings calls are, at least in France, a legal requirement intended to promote market transparency (para 122). While the Commission did not dispute the right to hold such calls, it emphasized that they cannot be used to engage in collusive practices, regardless of their public nature (para 123). This serves as a clear signal to all markets: competition law compliance applies just as rigorously to all forms of public communication, and market participants should be mindful of the language they use in public statements. In contrast, the requirement to comply in private discussions has long been established – and breaches have been severely punished by the authorities.
It is important to note that, at this stage, the Commission has not established any infringement of competition law by the tyre manufacturers. Rather, the Judgment confirms that the Commission is entitled to a certain degree of flexibility when initiating and conducting inspections under Article 20(4) of Regulation 1/2003 in relation to potential collusion.
By Akos Reger
