Introduction
On 11 January 2026, the Court of Milan, Business Section A (the ‘Court’), delivered a significant ruling[1] in follow-on antitrust damages litigation brought by 18 transport companies against Iveco and the other major truck manufacturers MAN, DAF, Scania, Mercedes-Benz (Daimler), and Volvo/Renault.
The case stems from the European Commission’s (‘Commission’) landmark decision (the ‘EC Decision’)[2] finding that these manufacturers participated in a long-running Europe-wide cartel between 1997 and 2011, coordinating gross list prices and the timing of the introduction of new emission technologies (‘LKW cartel’). The Court’s judgment adds an important chapter to the growing body of national litigation arising from the LKW cartel and offers valuable insights into the evolving landscape of private antitrust enforcement in Italy.
Chronology of the proceedings
Filing of the claim
On 5 October 2017, a group of transport companies filed a claim before the Court against Iveco, seeking compensation for damages caused by its participation in the LKW cartel. The claimants, having purchased medium and heavy trucks from manufacturers involved in the infringement, alleged that they had suffered substantial harm as a result of the established anticompetitive conduct.
In particular, they sought compensation for (i) the overcharge paid on the purchase of trucks as a result of the coordination of gross list prices, and (ii) the harm arising from the coordinated delay in introducing new emission technologies (EURO 3 to 6), which allegedly deprived them of the opportunity to acquire vehicles equipped with the most advanced emission standards available at the time. Overall, the total damage claim amounted to more than €5 million.
Defence and preliminary objections
In its defence, Iveco requested authorisation to summon the other members of the LKW cartel as third parties in the proceedings. Furthermore, Iveco raised several preliminary and substantive objections, including: statutory limitation defences; challenges to the applicability and retroactive effect of Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages[3] and its Italian implementing legislation (Legislative Decree No. 3/2017)[4]; requests for referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Italian Constitutional Court; objections to the evidentiary value of the EC Decision; and arguments contesting both the existence of an overcharge and the claimants’ passing-on of that overcharge to their own customers.
Third-party summons and limitation ruling
The other parties raised similar objections, particularly concerning the statute of limitations and the lack of proof of actual impact on final net prices.
On 24 May 2021, the Court issued a partial judgment which rejected the limitation objection, ruling that the limitation period had not expired. This judgment was confirmed by the Milan Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Cassation and has therefore become final.
Scania-related claims
Initially, the Court separated claims related to Scania trucks because Scania had appealed the Commission’s findings. Once the General Court[5] confirmed the decision against Scania in 2022, these claims were rejoined in the main proceedings.
Expert assessment
The proceedings then moved into the evidentiary phase. The Court required a court-appointed expert assessment (Consulente Tecnico d’Ufficio, ‘CTU’) to assist in the technical and economic evaluation of the claims.
The CTU was tasked with determining (i) whether and to what extent the LKW cartel influenced the net purchase prices of vehicles acquired by the claimants; (ii) whether and to what extent the cartel caused an overcharge on the final purchase price of the trucks concerned; (iii) which specific vehicles fell within the infringement or its subsequent lingering period; (iv) whether the overcharge was passed on to downstream customers and, if so, to calculate the potential loss of profits resulting from it; and (v) whether the delay in the introduction of new emission technology caused damage and, if so, to determine the extent of such damage.
This mandate was later expanded to specifically incorporate findings from the Commission and General Court decisions regarding the Scania group and to integrate additional questions for the CTU’s assessment, namely: (vi) determine the applicable monetary revaluation and legal interest; (vii) consider the impact of tax benefits obtained by the claimants; and (viii) identify which documents were strictly necessary to avoid a “massive” and potentially irrelevant production of documents.
Settlement proposal
On 30 April 2025, the Court proposed a settlement: a 5% overcharge for the infringement period and 2.5% for a short lingering period. The claimants accepted the proposal, but Iveco, Scania, and MAN rejected it. Notably, in September 2025, Volvo/Renault and Mercedes-Benz (Daimler) reached separate out-of-court settlements with several claimants. The remaining case against Iveco and the non-settling third parties was then submitted to the panel for the final judgment.
Judgment by the Court of Milan
Binding nature of the EC Decision
The Court reaffirmed that the Commission’s decisions (both the 2016 settlement decision and the 2017 Scania decision[6]) are legally binding on national courts regarding the existence of the antitrust infringement. This binding effect applies even to decisions reached through a settlement procedure, as the manufacturers voluntarily acknowledged their responsibility.
Rejection of the limitation defence
The defendants’ argument that the claims were time-barred was rejected. The Court ruled that the limitation period only began to run once the victims became aware of the infringement and the resulting damage, which in this case was the publication of the EC Decision.
Temporal application of the Damages Directive
The Court addressed the temporal applicability of Directive 2014/104/EU and Legislative Decree No. 3/2017, both adopted after the infringement had ended. It concluded that their substantive provisions do not apply retroactively. As a result, the presumption that cartels cause harm and the presumption in favour of indirect purchasers were deemed inapplicable.
However, this did not preclude the finding of damage. The Court relied on general civil law principles to conclude that the LKW cartel was highly likely to have generated an overcharge. Likewise, the burden of proving any passing-on remained with the defendants.
Existence and nature of damage
In light of its duration and market coverage, the Court concluded that the LKW cartel inevitably led to an overcharge for final purchasers. It further confirmed that the infringement covered all purchases of medium trucks (6 to 16 tonnes) and heavy trucks (over 16 tonnes), applying to new vehicles and excluding used trucks.
Although the LKW cartel focused on gross list prices, the Court concluded that this had a direct effect on the final net prices paid by customers, as list prices are a fundamental component in all subsequent pricing stages. The Court applied the “sea-level effect” (effetto marea) logic: if list prices are artificially inflated by a cartel, the final negotiated prices will inevitably be higher than they would have been under normal competition, regardless of the discounts applied.
Overcharge quantification
The Court rejected the initial expert estimate of approximately 4.08% of the actual purchase price as being excessively low and inconsistent with its finding that the cartel had caused harm. The CTU’s assessment consisted of an average between the claimants’ regression results (adjusted for the exclusion of lingering effects) and the defendants’ regression results, leading to no overcharge, in contradiction to the determination of the existence of damage.
Instead, the Court exercised its equitable power to (conservatively) set the overcharge at 8% of the purchase price for trucks bought during the infringement period and at 4% of the purchase price for trucks bought during the lingering period (up to the end of 2011). This result is consistent with other CTU analyses submitted in parallel proceedings concerning the same cartel, which estimated overcharges ranging from 9.83% to 12.6%.
Inclusion of the lingering effect
The judgment recognised that cartel effects do not disappear immediately when the illegal coordination officially ends. Given the 14-year duration of the LKW cartel, the Court found it highly possible that prices remained artificially high for a period after January 2011, extending the damage calculation to trucks purchased until 31 December 2011.
Rejection of the “passing-on” defence
The manufacturers argued that the transport companies had transferred the overcharge downstream to their own customers. The Court dismissed this defence, noting that: (i) the transport companies were small “price-takers” within a highly fragmented market; and (ii) the overcharge represented a minimal percentage of their total revenue, making it implausible that they adjusted their service prices because of it.
Refusal of delay damages
The transport companies’ claim for damages caused by the delayed introduction of new emission technologies was rejected. The Court ruled that the claimants failed to prove and substantiate the causal link between the infringement and the loss of chance, as well as the reasonable likelihood that, without the infringement, they would have purchased trucks with newer standards had they been available.
Final orders and liability
Although Iveco was identified as the primary defendant and ordered to compensate the claimants, the Court reaffirmed the principle of joint and several liability among all members of the LKW cartel. At the same time, the Court clarified that Iveco retains the right to seek contribution from the other cartel participants in proportion to the trucks they produced and the damage attributable to them.
With respect to trucks manufactured by Volvo, Renault and Mercedes-Benz (Daimler), the claims of some claimants were declared extinguished as a result of out-of-court settlements concluded during the proceedings.
Legal interest and monetary revaluation
The Court established that damages are subject to monetary revaluation and legal interest from the date of the original truck purchase. In addition, from the date the lawsuit was filed until compensation is paid, the Court awarded interest at the higher rate specified in Article 1284(4) of the Italian Civil Code (the rate typically applied to commercial transactions) in place of further monetary revaluation and standard legal interest.
During the technical assessment phase of the trial, the claimants requested the application of the WACC (‘Weighted Average Cost of Capital’) rate. They argued that this rate represented the potential return on capital they would reasonably have obtained had they been able to reinvest the overcharged sums into their business activities. The Court refused to apply the WACC rate, since the claimants failed to specifically allege or prove that their actual expected return on capital would have matched the WACC or that they had suffered a specific “greater damage” (under Article 1224 of the Italian Civil Code) that would justify a rate higher than the statutory one.
Conclusion
This ruling provides further clarity on Italian courts’ approach to cartel damage claims, in particular in the context of complex cases such as the LKW cartel.
Notably, the Court adopted an active role in assessing the evidence, scrutinising the court-appointed expert’s findings and exercising its equitable powers where it considered the technical assessment to be insufficient or inconsistent with the overall evidentiary framework. Its hands-on approach to damage quantification, lingering effects, and passing-on confirms a willingness to engage with the legal and economic dimensions of cartel damages. The Court also navigated the temporal limits of the Damages Directive while relying on general principles of civil law to ensure effective judicial protection.
More broadly, the judgment suggests that Italy continues to develop its practice in line with wider European trends in private antitrust enforcement, thereby contributing to a progressively more structured and predictable environment for follow-on damages actions.
By Giulia Rurali and Danilo Samà
[1] Court of Milan, Judgment No 212/2026, R.G. 47822/2017, 11 January 2026 (https://www.ilcaso.it/giurisprudenza/archivio/34210.pdf).
[2] European Commission, Decision of 19 July 2016, Case AT.39824 – LKW (https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39824/39824_8750_4.pdf).
[3] Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, Series L, No 349, 5 December 2014 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104).
[4] Legislative Decree No. 3 of 19 January 2017, implementing Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 15, 19 January 2017 (https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2017;3).
[5] General Court, Case T‑799/17 – Scania AB and Others v European Commission, Judgment of 2 February 2022 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A62017TJ0799).
[6] European Commission, Decision of 27 September 2017, Case AT.39824 – LKW (Scania) (https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39824/39824_8754_5.pdf).
